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Stockholm: Antisemitism, Ambivalence and Action

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Published by Humanity in Action in 2013, Civil Society and the Holocaust: International Perspectives on Resistance and Rescue examines the different ways that European countries and the United States responded to the Holocaust. This anthology was created as part of “Civil Society: Reactions to the Holocaust,” a series of events in Copenhagen commemorating the 70th anniversary of the flight and deportation of Danish Jews in October 1943.

“We didn’t have a question about race in our forms, but we did ask about religion. It is of some interest to us, when it comes to the planning of relief efforts and to be at service to all the different rescue organizations. At that time, before the world war, when we started to get so-called racial refugees, it was of utmost concern to get this information. [..] If they [converted Jews] came as refugees, they were kept in the books as M. The purpose was evidently to get a grip of the actual refugee problem.”

Carl Christian Schmidt, former head of the Foreigner’s Bureau, in interrogations after the war (1945) (1)

How else would the officials in Sweden be able to “get a grip of the actual refugee problem,” to quote his own words?

Carl Christian Schmidt, the former head of the Foreigner’s Bureau, was maybe lying to the Sandler commission in the interrogations after the war. (2) Or maybe he was just telling the truth the way he saw it. To him, marking converted Jewish refugees with a “m” for mosaic confession, though they clearly did not belong to the mosaic religion, made sense. How else would the officials in Sweden be able to “get a grip of the actual refugee problem,” to quote his own words? Even though Schmidt made an effort not to admit that the marking would have had anything to do with “race” or antisemitism, there is no other way we can interpret the actions today. To Schmidt, though, this was only matter-of-fact information needed to handle the applications for permits more smoothly. There is a saying in Sweden, “It’s only words,” however, in this case it is inaccurate. Words are important. Words matter. We use words to define and interpret everything we see and experience around us in society. If antisemitism doesn’t exist, we cannot understand it and in the end cannot do anything about it. This is as true today as it was back then. Sweden and its action during World War II and the Holocaust have often been described in heroic words as “the good Sweden,” a country which rescued thousands of Jewish refugees via Count Folke Bernadotte’s expedition with the White Buses, and via Raoul Wallenberg’s brave efforts in Hungary. (3) But in order to grasp the whole picture, one needs to step back in time before the end of the war and see how Sweden treated Jewish refugees before and during the war. In this essay, I will explore the Swedish reactions to the Holocaust by examining the reactions of the authorities in charge of the refugee policy, as well as the actions by single individuals and organizations in civil society who, in the name of democracy and freedom, tried to help persecuted Jews find a refuge in Sweden.

“Sweden would in practice be a door through which […] ‘non-aryans’ would seek to flee”

In order to grasp the whole picture, one needs to step back in time before the end of the war and see how Sweden treated Jewish refugees before and during the war.

So, let’s go back to “then,” or more precisely to the fall of 1938 when more Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany also began to arrive to Sweden. Already after the German annexation of Austria, the pressure towards the Swedish borders increased. During the summer of 1938, the now infamous conference in the French city of Evian was held, where country after coun- try expressed their deep regrets over the fate of the Jewish refugees, but explained, at the same time, that they were unable to do anything since they were no country of immigration and, more importantly, since they had no wish to “import a Jewish question.” This was also the opinion held by the Swedish officials present at the conference. (4)

What where they afraid of? Maybe the same things we are afraid of today: not the reality itself but the description of the reality.

The Swedish press in the 1930s was a myriad of voices but far too many sang the same xenophobic hymn about an invasion of Jewish refugees arriving in Sweden. (5) No hard facts of course, only rumors and suspicions. It is well known that when the shit hits the fan something that might not even exist suddenly becomes a problem, simply because it is given a name “the Jewish question.” What where they afraid of? Maybe the same things we are afraid of today: not the reality itself but the description of the reality. And in 1938, reality was described as if Sweden risked an invasion of Jewish refugees.

We proceed to early 1939 and despite the fact that antisemitism doesn’t exist in Sweden and despite the fact that Sweden yet lacks “a Jewish question,” Swedish officials are concerned by the reports in the media. The headlines shouts “Jewish invasion in Sweden!” and troubled men in suits turn their faces toward east. The real threat is not the well assimilated German and Austrian Jews, but the consequences of “the open door policy,” a policy if pursued would leave Sweden as the only country categorizing Jewish refugees as political such, and thus eligible for asylum. (6) In other words, the bureaucrats were afraid of the horde of eastern European Jews from Poland, Romania or Russia. Or put another way, they were afraid of the thought of what would happen if Sweden “opened the door” and gave permits to these refugees. Because no one knew exactly how many would actually try to flee to Sweden, only that it was a likely scenario that many would try. At this point in time, the officials don’t even know how many Jewish refugees Sweden already hosts. So the bureaucrats intend to find out.

No one knew exactly how many would actually try to flee to Sweden, only that it was a likely scenario that many would try.


the Daily Herald wrote an outraged note stating that “Sweden, one of the world’s most democratic nations, has apparently been forced at last by the Nazis into bowing the knee to their anti-Semitic theories,”

Already since 1932, Swedish authorities had been using a system of marking Jewish foreigners in minutes and files with “m.” From the beginning, the “m” was an abbreviation of “mosaic confession,” a legal expression. But despite the practice with the marking, no statistics over the amount of Jewish refugees exists. Therefore, The Foreigner’s Bureau requests permission from the government to pursue a Foreigner’s Census. The request was granted and between February 10 and 17 1939 every foreigner residing more than two days in Sweden had to participate in the census and fill out a form. The form asked legitimate questions about name, nationality and purpose of the stay, but question number 13 asked: “Whether either or both of the parents are Jews?” The instruction also clarified that this was regardless of whether they believed in the mosaic confession or not, i.e. regardless of religion but due to “race” in accordance with the Nuremberg Laws. In a press release where the census was presented, the Foreign Office emphasized that this shouldn’t be seen as “an expression of antisemitic tendencies” Swedish newspapers didn’t comment on the census but the Daily Herald wrote an outraged note stating that “Sweden, one of the world’s most democratic nations, has apparently been forced at last by the Nazis into bowing the knee to their anti-Semitic theories,” and they were surprised since they would expect “the very possibility of any discrimination between foreigners or citizens on the grounds of race or religion” to be “ludicrous to Swedes.” (7)

“The stones cry out”

The war began in September 1939 and Sweden, along with the other Nordic countries, declared itself neutral. The neutrality lasted throughout the war but has been much debated, especially since the 1990s, when new research claimed Sweden paid a high price. (8) Even too high? Maybe. But was there an alternative? From the occupation of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 and after Finland in June 1941 for the second time was in war with the Soviet Union, Sweden was surrounded and also demilitarized since World War I. From a military point of view there wasn’t much Sweden could have done. What would have been possible though, if Sweden would have wanted to make a difference, was to accept larger amounts of refugees early on and especially before the outbreak of war. (9) But the policy of the open door was not pursued, and the reason why was fear. Fear that “antisemitism would rise.” Fear that Sweden would get “a Jewish question.” (10) The pale cast of thought.

The policy of the open door was not pursued, and the reason why was fear. Fear that “antisemitism would rise.” Fear that Sweden would get “a Jewish question.” (10)

The newspapers which recently cried the hymn of xenophobia were now seemingly quieter about how Nazi Germany treated its Jewish population. Sure, there were reports in the press, but the Swedish state used censorship and confiscated papers with critical articles. The most important cog in the machinery was not the censorship though, but the self-censorship undertaken by the newspapers themselves. The pressure against the papers was hard during the winter of 1942 and in March, a large confiscation was made toward 17 papers which had reported about concentration camps. (11)

The machinery of bureaucracy kept going. More applications from Jewish refugees were rejected but some were still given a permit. There was never a complete stop – the “door” was ajar. “Race” (“folkras”) is an established terminology which, since 1938, together with marking with “m” separates Jewish refugees from other refugees in accordance with the “racial” definition of the Nuremberg Laws. Not according to the Swedish Law, of course, but in practice. The same practice also operated with the phrase “the usual addendum” as an explanatory statement of why applications from Jewish refugees were rejected. This phrase meant that the rejection was motivated by the ban on Jewish refugees from October 1941 leaving Germany and occupied coun- tries. And because of the ban, their permits were rejected. (12)

If they refused, they were escorted by Swedish soldiers who returned them to the German border patrol on the Norwegian side.

The officials at the Foreigner’s Bureau looked westwards to the order in Quisling’s Norway. They cast worried looks eastwards toward “the Russian threat” and ponder whether Finland would make it. At the same time, Norwegian and Finnish refugees were crossing the borders. The Finns were accepted. So were the Norwegians, as long as they were not “emigrants,” i.e. Jewish, and as long as they didn’t try to cross at the “wrong” border control managed by the “wrong” official (“landsfiskal”). If so, they were told to return. If they refused, they were escorted by Swedish soldiers who returned them to the German border patrol on the Norwegian side. If they agreed to return freely, they had the opportunity to walk alongside the border and find another border control with a less strenuous official, and, if lucky, get accepted. (13)

On November 26th, 1942, the first group of Norwegian Jews was forced to board the SS Donau for deportation. They arrived by train to Auschwitz-Birkenau on December 1st. The men were selected for slave labor while the women, children and elderly were immediately gassed to death in Bunker 2.

But then something happened in Norway. There had been measures toward the Norwegian Jews already earlier. Their possessions had been registered and confiscated. But suddenly everything happened so fast. On November 26th, 1942, the first group of Norwegian Jews was forced to board the SS Donau for deportation. They arrived by train to Auschwitz-Birkenau on December 1st. The men were selected for slave labor while the women, children and elderly were immediately gassed to death in Bunker 2. The Nazis and their Norwegian collaborators worked tirelessly to make Norway “judenrein” and in 1944, 770 Norwegian Jews had been deported to Auschwitz. Of these, only 24 survived. (14)

In 1944, 770 Norwegian Jews had been deported to Auschwitz. Of these, only 24 survived. (14)

Something was also happening in Sweden. The self-censorship in the press stopped and during the spring and summer of 1942 reports of the persecution and mass murders in occupied Europe were published in anti-Nazi newspapers such as Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning and Trots Allt!. (15) Other papers also published reports, and September seems to be a turning point when Dagens Nyheterpublished the headline “The pogroms against Jews have to be stopped” and in its editorial concluded that “the persecution of the Jews” had “become harder and harsher. The end goal seems to be physical annihilation.” (16) In October 1942 historian Hugo Valentin published his know famous article “The War of Extermination toward the Jews.” (17)

Even the churches decided to break the silence and criticize the deportations in their advent prayers.

So, when the deportations began in Norway on November 26, Swedish newspapers decided to speak out and the self-censorship that previously had been practiced was long gone. The Swedish radio reported in a telegram that “The Jewish Question in Norway seems to have found its final solution” with the deportation of the Norwegian Jews on a ship to an unknown destination. (18) The coming days, Swedish papers published several articles about the events and Swedes arranged meetings to protest the deportation, for instance held by the organization Fighting for Democracy (Förbundet Kämpande Demokrati) and by many women’s organizations. (19)  Even the churches decided to break the silence and criticize the deportations in their advent prayers. The dean (domprost) in Gothenburg, Olle Nystedt, turned his preaching into an outraged appeal and quoted the gospel of Luke: “if these were silent, the stones would cry out.” (20) On the last day of the year, Dagens Nyheter published an opinion poll which showed that an overwhelming majority of the Swedes considered the deportation of the Norwegian Jews the event causing the most outrage during 1942. More than reports about the turn of the war, about Stalingrad and El Alamein. (21) How come? Because at the eve of the New Year, everyone who read the newspapers most likely knew about the persecution and the murders. Because the Jews were Norwegians, a fellow people (broderfolk), because they were just like us. (22)

The machinery of bureaucracy halts and slowly begins to move again; only this time in reverse. The very same officials at the embassies in Oslo and Berlin who previously argued they couldn’t do anything for the refugees, because they were Jewish, now engage in the faith of the refugees simply because they are Jews. Norwegian Jews. This bureaucratic resistance started with the fellow people but soon embraced Jews of other nationalities as well. (23)

“A foreign element within the nation”

The shift in policy in 1942 inarguably moved Sweden from a bystander to a rescuer, but did it also lead to a shift in attitudes? Did antisemitism become visible? The answer is no, the attitudes prevailed, and part of the problem was that antisemitic attitudes weren’t considered as such, but as strictly professional and unbiased matter-of-fact statements by the officials, as shown above with the statement by Carl Christian Schmidt. (24)

The separation of Norwegian refugees into “Jewish” and “non-Jewish” refugees was not seen as legitimate by the Swedish public.

Since the Foreigner’s Census in 1939 official statistics over foreigners and refugees separated Jews from other refugees. (25) From August 1941 this separation was also applied to the Norwegian and Danish Jews. (26) However, the separation of Norwegian refugees into “Jewish” and “non-Jewish” refugees was not seen as legitimate by the Swedish public. On September 7 1943, political economist Karin Kock formulated a harsh critique against the Foreigner’s Bureau in an article in the paper Socialdemokraten, questioning the separation and asked about the grounds. (27) The head of the Foreigner’s Bureau, Carl Christian Schmidt, replied that the separation was made before the war when the Bureau separated between refugees fleeing for political reasons and “racial refugees” and added that there was no difference in the treatment of these two groups. (28)

“Separating the Jews into special groups within each nationality gives, in its statistical objectivity, gives support to antisemitic ideas, which build upon perceptions of the Jew as a foreign element within the nation.” (29)

But Kock wasn’t pleased with the answer and published yet another article in the same paper where she asked why the Bureau “separates Jews from other refugees” and accused the authorities of having “accepted the unscientific imported terminology ‘race’ from the south and used it as a category in Swedish statistics.” She also asked if there were any reasons to keep the separation since it didn’t seem to be used anyway. Finally, she connected the use of “race” with antisemitism: “Separating the Jews into special groups within each nationality gives, in its statistical objectivity, gives support to antisemitic ideas, which build upon perceptions of the Jew as a foreign element within the nation.” (29)  Schmidt replied that he found “no reason to – out of consideration to the antisemitic efforts, which by chance could exist in this country – suppress the objective information, which the statistic is supposed to give.” (30)

When the Danish Jews fled to Sweden in October 1943, Kock again criticized the Bureau and the Foreign Office for their use of “race” (folkras) and asked what the officials themselves would answer if questioned about their own “race”: “I don’t think they know, but they do know what answer they want from the rest of us: Jew or non-Jew, or translated to another language aryan or non-aryan” and demanded that the authorities remove the question from the forms immediately. (31)

Officially, Karin Kock’s protests seemingly had an effect and the Bureau no longer published statistics where Jews were separated in their own group. (32) But unofficially the separation continued, both in forms filled out by the Danish Jews rescued in October 1943, and in confidential memorandums written by the authorities. (33)

The Janus face of Swedish refugee policy

I personally have a quite extensive experience of the difficulties for Jewish refugees to find a refuge in Sweden. I have walked the steps up to the Foreigner’s Bureau, but in most cases when I have tried to get a permit for someone, my request has been rejected. So there is no doubt the right to asylum has been narrow. If we would have pursued a more liberal policy earlier than the fall of 1941 and accepted Jewish refugees, many lives could have been saved. It is very likely these refugees are now dead. Erik Brandt in a speech in the Swedish Parliament, 1943 (34)

“It must have been because they belonged to the mosaic confession – we couldn’t really investigate whether they were whole-, half- or a partly Jewish.”

After the war, a commission was appointed with the task to investigate, among other things, the handling of the refugees and the official refugee policy during the war. In interrogations made by the commission with former Bureau officials, they asked whether the marking with “m” implied “race” or not. The officials denied the link as they were well aware that such a notion was illegitimate. A former head of the Bureau, Ernst Bexelius, answered: “it must have been because they belonged to the mosaic confession – we couldn’t really investigate whether they were whole-, half- or a partly Jewish.”

When the commission pointed out that “race” wasn’t a category in Swedish official statistics, only the religious terminology “of the mosaic confession” existed. Bexelius answered that the Bureau didn’t have any reason not to use the official statistical terminology. (35) When asked if he knew when the question of “race” was first used in forms he replied: “I believe it must have been in connection with the rescue efforts of these people, i.e. that it would have been positive for their chances to get here, if we knew, whether they were of the mosaic confession or not. Any other position would not have been plausible for a Swedish authority.” (36) Bexelius argument made perfect sense – since antisemitism didn’t exist Swedish authorities’ couldn’t have applied an antisemitic or “racial” vocabulary either.

Since antisemitism didn’t exist Swedish authorities’ couldn’t have applied an antisemitic or “racial” vocabulary either.

The Swedish reactions to the Holocaust shifted throughout the war. The reaction of the government and its authorities was restrictive and xenophobic in the beginning and turned into a large scale reception and rescue at the end. But the prejudiced attitudes toward the Jewish refugees remained as the mentality, influenced by antisemitic perceptions which from the beginning could be uttered but not recognized as such, while at the end denied since they were no longer perceived legitimate. The Swedish refugee policy can be characterized as a Janus face – dual in its ambivalence and struck by the antisemitic background noise.

The reactions of civil society were also ambivalent, although there were always individuals, organizations and newspapers that saw the antisemitic expressions for what they were and criticized them. There were strong anti- Nazi voices throughout the period, but they fought the headwind (motvind) in the beginning.

Therefore, Sweden’s actions during World War II and the Holocaust cannot be characterized as one and the same. In Sweden there were many who acted, and reacted. “Were the Swedish actions toward the persecuted Jews impressive or pitiful? asks historian Mattias Tydén and concludes: “Maybe it is precisely the ambivalence that should be highlighted.” (37)

 

•     •     •

Citation

Kvist Geverts, Karin. “Stockholm:  Antisemitism, ambivalence and action.” In Civil Society and the Holocaust: International Perspectives on Resistance and Rescue, edited by Anders Jerichow and Cecilie Felicia Stokholm Banke, 137-147. New York: Humanity in Action Press, 2013.

References

  • Boëthus, Maria-Pia, Heder och samvete. Sverige och andra världskriget, Norstedt: Stockholm 1991.
  • Bruchfeld, Stéphane & Paul A. Levine, …om detta må ni berätta… En bok om Förintelsen i Europa 1933-1945, Regeringskansliet Levande historia: Stockholm 1998.
  • Byström,  Mikael,  “En  talande  tystnad?  Ett  antisemitiskt  bakgrundsbrus i riksdagsdebatterna 1942-1947”, in Lars M Andersson & Karin Kvist Geverts (eds.), En problematisk relation? Flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna i Sverige 1920-1950, Opuscula Historica Upsaliensia 36, Uppsala 2008, p. 119-137.
  • Byström, Mikael & Karin Kvist Geverts, “Från en aktivism till en annan. Hur ska Sveriges agerande i flyktingfrågan under andra världskriget förklaras?”, Sverige och Nazityskland. Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt, Dialogos: Stockholm 2007, p. 148-167.
  • Byström, Mikael, En broder, gäst och parasit. Uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktingpolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942- 1947, Stockholm 2006.
  • Folkmängden inom administrativa områden den 31 december 1939, Statistiska Centralbyrån, Sveriges Officiella Statistik (SOS), P.A. Norstedt & Söner: Stockholm 1940.
  • Kock, Karin, “Öppen fråga till Kungl. Socialstyrelsen”, Socialdemokraten, 7.9.1943.
  • Kock, Karin, “Socialstyrelsen och statistiken över flyktingarna”, Socialdemokraten, 9.9.1943.
  • Kock, Karin, “Folkras? Race? Rasse? Race?”, Socialdemokraten, 9.10.1943.
  • Kvist, Karin, “A Study of Antisemitic Attitudes within Sweden’s Wartime Utlänningsbyrån”, in ‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust. A Re-evaluation, David Cesarani & Paul A. Levine (eds.), Frank Cass: London 2002, p. 199-211.
  • Kvist Geverts, Karin, Ett främmande element i nationen. Svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938-1944, Studia Historica Upsaliensia 233 & UUHGS Publications 2, dissertation, Uppsala 2008.
  • Larsmo, Ola, Djävulssonaten. Ur det svenska hatets historia, Albert Bonniers förslag: Stockholm 2007.
  • Lindberg, Hans, Svensk flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936-1941, Allmänna förlaget: Stockholm 1973.
  • Levine, Paul A, From Indifference to Activism. Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust; 1938-1944, Uppsala 1998.
  • Parlamentariska undersökningskommissionen (PUK), YK 984, Stenographic report of conversation with head of the Bureau Schmidt, 18.5.1945.
  • PUK, F 3:1, Stenographic report of the commissions conversation with the head of the Bureau Bexelius, 11.5.1945.
  • Riksdagstrycket 1943, första kammarens protokoll nr. 18.
  • Riksdagstrycket 1939, andra kammarens protokoll nr. 12.
  • Rogers, John & Marie Clark Nelson, “‘Lapps, Finns, Gypsies, Jews, and Idiots’. Modernity and the use of statistical categories in Sweden, in Annales de démographie historique, 2003:1.
  • Schmidt, Carl Christian, “Socialstyrelsen svarar docent Kock”, Socialdemokraten, 8.9.1943.
  • Schmidt, Carl Christian,“Socialstyrelsen och flyktingarna”, Socialdemokraten, 11.9.1943.
  • Sociala Meddelanden, 1939:4.
  • Svanberg, Ingvar & Mattias Tydén, Sverige och Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933-1945, Dialogos: Stockholm 2005.
  • Tydén, Mattias, “Att inte lägga sig i. Till frågan om Sveriges moraliska skuld till Förintelsen”, in Sverige och Nazityskland. Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt, Lars M Andersson & Mattias Tydén (eds.), Dialogos: Stockholm 2007.
  • Utrikesdepartementet (UD), 1920 års dossiersystem, P:1331, PM angående antalet flyktingar i Sverige, Gösta Engzell, 15.2.1944.
  • Åmark, Klas, Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och Förintelsen, Albert Bonniers Förlag: Stockholm 2011.

Notes

  1. Riksarkivet (RA), Parlamentariska undersökningskommissionen (PUK), YK 984, Stenographic report of conversation with head of the Bureau Schmidt, 18.5.1945, p. 46-47.
  2. The two authorities in charge of the refugee policy was the Foreigner’s Bureau and the Foreign Office.
  3. For a critical review, see Mikael Byström & Karin Kvist Geverts, “Från en aktivism till en annan. Hur ska Sveriges agerande i flyktingfrågan under andra världskriget förklaras?”, Sverige och Nazityskland. Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt, Dialogos: Stockholm 2007.
  4. Hans Lindberg, Svensk flyktingpolitik under internationellt tryck 1936-1941, Allmänna förlaget: Stockholm 1973, p. 111.
  5. Karin Kvist Geverts, Ett främmande element i nationen. Svensk flyktingpolitik och de judiska flyktingarna 1938-1944, Studia Historica Upsaliensia 233 & UUHGS Publications 2, dissertation, Uppsala 2008, p. 80; Svanberg, Ingvar & Mattias Tydén, Sverige och Förintelsen. Debatt och dokument om Europas judar 1933-1945, Dialogos: Stockholm 2005, p. 160.
  6. Karin Kvist, “A Study of Antisemitic Attitudes within Sweden’s Wartime Utlänningsbyrån”, in ‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust. A Re-evaluation, David Cesarani & Paul A. Levine (eds.), Frank Cass: London 2002, p. 203.
  7. For all the quotes in this paragraph, see Kvist Geverts 2008, p. 82-84.
  8. For one of the first critiques of the war years in Sweden, see Maria-Pia Boëthus, Heder och samvete. Sverige och andra världskriget, Norstedt: Stockholm 1991.
  9. Klas Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazityskland och Förintelsen, Albert Bonniers Förlag: Stockholm 2011, chap. 18, and most importantly p. 657-658.
  10. Kvist Geverts 2008, chap. 4.
  11. Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 228.
  12. Kvist Geverts 2008 , p. 169 & 179-180.
  13. Ola Larsmo, Djävulssonaten. Ur det svenska hatets historia, Albert Bonniers förslag: Stock- holm 2007, p. 149-150.
  14. Stéphane Bruchfeld & Paul A. Levine, …om detta må ni berätta… En bok om Förintelsen i Europa 1933-1945, Regeringskansliet Levande historia: Stockholm 1998, p. 43.
  15. Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 237-241.
  16. “Judepogromer måste stoppas”, Dagens Nyheter, 12.9.1942 and editorial, Dagens Nyheter, 13.9.1942, quoted in Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 241-242.
  17. Hugo Valentin, “Utrotningskriget mot judarna”, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, 13.10.1942, quoted in Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 260-246.
  18. Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 249.
  19. Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 250-257.
  20. Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 258-259.
  21. “Norge främst under 1942”, in Dagens Nyheter, 31.12.1942, quoted in Svanberg & Tydén 2005, p. 260-261.
  22. Paul A Levine, From Indifference to Activism. Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust; 1938- 1944, Uppsala 1998; Mikael Byström, En broder, gäst och parasit. Uppfattningar och föreställningar om utlänningar, flyktingar och flyktingpolitik i svensk offentlig debatt 1942-1947, Stockholm 2006.
  23. Levine 1998, p. X.
  24. Kvist Geverts 2008, p. 289.
  25. Kvist Geverts 2008, p. 214.
  26. Kvist Geverts 2008, p. 217.
  27. Karin Kock, “Öppen fråga till Kungl. Socialstyrelsen”, Socialdemokraten, 7.9.1943.
  28. Carl Christian Schmidt, “Socialstyrelsen svarar docent Kock”, Socialdemokraten, 8.9.1943.
  29. Karin Kock, “Socialstyrelsen och statistiken över flyktingarna”, Socialdemokraten, 9.9.1943.
  30. Carl Christian Schmidt, “Socialstyrelsen och flyktingarna”, Socialdemokraten, 11.9.1943.
  31. Karin Kock, “Folkras? Race? Rasse? Race?”, Socialdemokraten, 9.10.1943.
  32. Se exempelvis “Utlänningar i Sverige vid årsskiftet 1943/1944”, Sociala Meddelanden, 1944:2, s. 152.
  33. RA, Utrikesdepartementet (UD), 1920 års dossiersystem, P:1331, PM angående antalet flyktingar i Sverige, Gösta Engzell, 15.2.1944.
  34. Erik Brandt (social democrat), speech in the Swedish Parliament, Riksdagstrycket 1943, första kammarens protokoll nr. 18, p. 6-27.
  35. This is a truth with a modification. Jews were categorized as belonging to “the mosaic confession”, but this information was used to signal “race” since they were placed in the column “foreign races”, and not, which would make more sense, “foreign religions”, see Rogers, John & Marie Clark Nelson, “‘Lapps, Finns, Gypsies, Jews, and Idiots’. Modernity and the use of statistical categories in Sweden, in Annales de démographie historique, 2003:1, s. 71–72.
  36. RA, PUK, F 3:1, Stenographic report of the commissions conversation with the head of the Bureau Bexelius, 11.5.1945, p. 86.
  37. Mattias Tydén, “Att inte lägga sig i. Till frågan om Sveriges moraliska skuld till Förintelsen”, in Sverige och Nazityskland. Skuldfrågor och moraldebatt, Lars M Andersson & Mattias Tydén (eds.), Dialogos: Stockholm 2007, p. 127.